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3ABSTRACT
We examine the effects of two forms of capital, i.e. human capital and social capital, on
innovation at the country level. We use secondary data from the World Development Report on a
country’s overall human development to test for a relationship between human capital and
innovation. We also use previous conceptualisations of social capital as comprising trust,
associational activity, and norms of civic behaviour to test for relationships between these
indicators of social capital and innovation using data from the World Values Survey. Unlike most
previous studies that examined human and social capital within a given country, we develop and
empirically test a theoretically grounded model that relates human and social capital to innovation
at the societal level across 59 different countries, thus providing a more global view of the role of
these two forms of capital in generating value. We find strong support for the positive
relationship between human capital and innovation and partial support for the positive effect of
trust and associational activity on innovation. However, contrary to our prediction, we find a
negative relationship between norms of civic behaviour and one of our innovation measures.
Keywords: social capital; human capital; innovation; cross-country comparison
4INTRODUCTION
There has been significant increase in the knowledge-intensive side of economic activity
at the global level. This has in turn increased academic and practitioners’ interest in the various
facets of knowledge creation and transfer within and between borders (Crosby, 2000). In this
paper, we focus on innovation as one of the most important aspects of knowledge creation
(Collinson, 2000) and we explore the role of two forms of capital, i.e. human capital and social
capital, as antecedents to innovative activity at the societal level.
Prior researchers have examined how countries differ in terms of their level of innovative
activity and have used Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions (i.e. uncertainty avoidance,
individualism, power distance, and masculinity-femininity) to explain why certain countries
innovate more than others. For instance, Shane (1992) found that individualistic and non-
hierarchical societies are more inventive than other societies. Further, it has been suggested that
societies that are more willing to accept uncertainty may be more innovative than uncertainty-
avoiding societies because the legitimacy of innovation championing roles is greater in
corporations within the former societies (Shane, 1995). Similarly, prior research has examined
how different societies differ in terms of their ‘entrepreneurial behaviour’ based on the cultural
values that are prevalent within a country. That is, it has been suggested that individuals from
‘doing-oriented’ cultures (e.g. the US) emphasise personal accomplishments and goal
achievement to a greater extent than people from more ‘being-oriented’ cultures (e.g. the
Netherlands) (Adler, 1997). For instance, Kemelgor (2002) found significant differences in the
level of entrepreneurial orientation between US firms and their Dutch counterparts. In this paper
we further build on the notion that commonalities within countries with regard to (1) individuals’
resources and (2) the manner in which individuals interact with and relate to each other affect a
country’s economic activity.
More specifically, we examine the relationship between the amount of human capital and
social capital within a country on the one hand, and the country’s level of innovation on the other
hand. It should be noted upfront that an important part of the literature that examined the effect of
human capital and social capital on economic outcomes has focused on processes and phenomena
that take place at the regional (i.e. subnational) rather than the national level. For instance, the
research on industrial districts and innovative milieus has argued that economic development at
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business exchanges, social prestige related to local entrepreneurial behaviour, and geographical
proximity between a critical mass of human and physical capital (Bellandi, 2001; Maskell &
Malmberg, 1999; Saxanian, 1994) as well as by the existence of ‘untraded interdependencies’
such as common procedures and rules for processing and exchanging knowledge (Storper, 1995).
Furthermore, prior research on social capital has outlined differences in the levels of social capital
between regions and communities within the same national borders.  Onyx and Bullen (2000), for
example, found that the level of social capital differs between five communities in Australia.
Putnam (1993a, 1993b) also discussed differences in the level of social capital between Northern
and Southern Italy and argued that the disparity in the economic development levels between
these two regions are attributed to differences in social capital. Consequently, we acknowledge
that the value of human and social capital on society often stems from the dynamics that occur in
tightly-knit social groups, but at the same time, we argue that economic development and output
at the national level is the result of the aggregate economic activity of individual regions within a
country. That is, we confer with a ‘generative growth’ model for societies (Maillat, 1998) which
maintains that the economic well-being of a region within a country does not necessarily occur at
the expense of another region within that same country. In other words, we assume that ‘the
growth performance of an individual region can be raised and may have an impact on the national
growth rate without necessarily adversely affecting the growth rate of its neighbours. Growth
through new technical innovation is a case in point’ (Maillat, 1998: 2). Therefore, our study is
consistent with prior research that speaks to the role of government and policy makers in
enhancing overall national growth by stimulating the innovative capability of individual regions
(Camagni, 1992).  Nonetheless, one has to  remain cognizant to the fact that within-nation, and
even within-region variations in the levels of human capital, social capital, and innovative
activities do exist.
Human capital
The concept of human capital pertains to individuals’ knowledge and abilities that allow
for changes in action and economic growth (Coleman, 1988). Human capital may be developed
through formal training and education aimed at updating and renewing one’s capabilities in order
6to do well in society. Prior researchers have made a distinction between different types of human
capital (Florin & Schultlze, 2000).
Firm-specific human capital pertains to skills and knowledge that are valuable only within
a specific firm. For instance, prior researchers have examined the impact of firm-related know-
how within the founding team on the success rate of high-growth start-up firms (e.g. Sandberg,
1986). Although firm-specific skills may give firms an advantage over their competitors as these
skills are not transferable to other firms (Grant, 1996), the limited amount of communication and
interfirm reaction attached to those skills makes this type of human capital only have a limited
impact on the level of innovative activity within a region or the wider society.
Industry-specific human capital pertains to knowledge derived from experience specific to
an industry, and several researchers have examined the role of industry experience on the growth
and economic performance of entrepreneurial ventures (e.g. Siegel, Siegel, & MacMillan, 1993)
as well as society (e.g., Kenney & von Burg, 1999). Prior research has suggested that industry-
specific human capital may play an important role in the generation of innovative activity within
an industry if it is characterised by high-quality knowledge exchange among the main players
within that industry (e.g. Bianchi, 2001). The presence of industry-related know-how will be in
particular powerful in creating innovations when new product or process ideas result from the
combination of intimate communication among network partners on the one hand and tacit know-
how present in existing technology on the other hand. The tacit nature of industry-specific know-
how makes this second type of human capital often only understandable for industry specialists
and therefore offers a protective mechanism which may decrease the need for patent protection
(David, 1975). Similarly, Maskell and Malmberg (1999) argued that proximity in a ‘cultural’
sense within a region or industry matters in terms of innovation in that the exchange of tacit
knowledge often requires a high degree of mutual understanding. Further, Saxanian (1999)
argued that the success of Silicon Valley is partly related to the presence of an intensive flow of
tacit know-how among local firms and a culture directed at open communication, which
ultimately resulted in a steady process of incremental knowledge development within that region;
the problems facing the Route 128 area, however, may be explained by a local culture of secrecy
and limited inter-firm cooperation.
Individual-specific human capital refers to knowledge that is applicable to a broad range
of firms and industries; it includes general managerial and entrepreneurial experience (e.g.
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training (e.g. Hinz, & Jungbauer-Gans, 1999), the individuals’ age, and total household income
(e.g. Kilkenny, Nalbarte, & Besser, 1999).  Prior research has shown that one’s overall level of
human capital has an impact on economic success, both at the business level and the macro-level.
For instance, Kilkenny and al. (1999) discussed a human capital model for success and suggested
that business success is positively related to one’s level of training, overall business experience
and total income.  Also, Prais (1995) examined how a country’s education and training system
may foster overall productivity. For instance, this author pointed to the need to have a right
balance of educational resources devoted to general academic issues and matters directly
connected to professional life, as well as to stimulate vocational training in order to provide
future employees with job-specific technical skills.
The focus in this paper is on the last type of human capital, i.e. one’s general ability and
skills in terms of education, physical condition and overall economic well-being. That is,
although we believe that industry-related expertise is an important driver for local innovative
activity, we take more of a macro-approach towards the effect of human capital on economic
success by focusing on the societal impact of human capital measured as a combination of the
overall educational attainment, economic resources and physical well-being of a country’s
citizens. One could argue that economic resources and physical well-being are potential outcomes
rather than indicators of human capital. For instance, Maskell and Malmberg (1999) argued that
some regions may be more viable and economically successful than others based on factors such
as the availability of knowledge and skills. However, as mentioned in the methodology section of
the paper, we check whether and how our representation of a country’s overall human capital is
related to a proxy of the level of business expertise and skills relevant to innovation, i.e. the
number of professionals active in R&D related activities.
Social capital
Unlike the economic view of human action that perceives individuals as resources that can
be developed and that can shape environmental factors, social capital takes a sociological view of
human action and perceives individuals as actors who are shaped by societal factors. Social
capital has received an increased attention in the literature and has been studied at multiple levels,
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(Putnam, 1993; Serageldin & Dasgupta, 2001). The central proposition in the social capital
literature is that networks of relationships constitute, or lead to, resources that can be used for the
good of the individual or the collective. First, at the individual level, social capital has been
defined as the resources embedded in one’s relationships with others.  The emphasis in this case
is on the actual or potential benefits that one accrues from his/her network of formal and informal
ties with others (Burt, 1992). Second, at the organisational level, social capital has been defined
as the value to an organisation in terms of the relationships formed by its members for the
purpose of engaging in collective action (Freel, 2000; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Third, the role
of social capital has also been examined on a more macro-level in terms of its impact on the well-
being of regions or societies (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman 1990; Putnam, 1993a, 1993b). Serageldin
and Dasgupta (2001), in their review of social capital, concurred with Coleman (1990) and
emphasized the role social capital has in the creation of human capital.  Prior research has also
examined the impact of industry structure on regional and societal development and explained
how ‘industrial districts’ represent local configurations that are high in social capital as they are
characterised by mutual trust, cooperation, and entrepreneurial spirit as well as a multitude of
local small firms (as opposed to large firms) with complementary specialised competencies
(Saxanian, 1994). In others words, some scholars have suggested that regions with a large number
of smaller but intensively interacting firms (and large firms possibly being embedded in these
networks of small firms) may be more likely to enjoy economic prosperity and entrepreneurial
vitality compared to areas dominated by large firms (Granovetter, 1973, 1985; Herrigel, 1996).
Similarly, Putnam (1993a, 1993b, 2000) conceptualised social capital as features of social
organisations, such as network structures, norms, and trust that facilitate coordination and
cooperation for mutual benefit within a society. His recent thesis on the decline of social capital
in the United States, and the negative consequences of this decline, has stirred an intense debate
as to the importance of social capital and its relatedness to the well-being of societies.
We focus on the value-generating potential of human capital and social capital at the
societal level. We develop arguments that speak to the role of human capital as a catalyst for
innovation, discuss the concept of social capital and review the way it has been conceptualised in
the literature, and develop arguments as to how the different dimensions of social capital affect
innovation. We test out model using a variety of secondary data sources including the World
9Value Survey and the United Nations. We discuss our findings, their implications as well as the
limitations of the study. We also provide directions for future research.
HYPOTHESES
Human capital and innovation
Human capital emanates from the fundamental assumption that humans posses skills and
abilities that can be improved, and as such can change the way people act (Becker, 1964). Human
capital is said to be embodied in the skills, knowledge, and expertise that people have; it has been
seen as an important source of competitive advantage to individuals, organisations, and societies
(Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997; Coleman, 1988). For example, Gimeno et al. (1997)
found a positive association between the overall level of human capital, as measured by education
level and work experience, and economic performance at both the entrepreneur’s level and the
firm’s level. Pennings, Kyungmook, and van Witteloostuijn (1998) found similar results in their
study of the effects of various forms of capital, including human capital, on firm dissolution.
The relationship between human capital and innovation at the country level is grounded in
what Bourdieu (1986) termed as ‘conversions’, that is different forms of capital can be converted
into resources and other forms of economic payoff. At the individual level, this conversion
process has been studied and validated by a number of researchers (e.g. Becker, 1964; Gradstein
& Justman, 2000). In general, the argument is that those who are better educated, have more
extensive work experience, and invest more time, energy, and resources in honing their skills are
better able to secure higher benefits for themselves, and at the same time are better able to
contribute to the overall well-being of the society. For instance, Maskell and Malmberg (1999)
argued that the overall stock of knowledge and skills in a society or region may enhance its
overall competitiveness. Further, innovation, as a knowledge intensive activity, is expected to be
related to human capital in multiple ways. Black and Lynch (1996) proposed that investment in
human capital through on-the-job training and education are the driving force behind increases in
productivity and competitiveness at the organisational level. Along the same lines, Cannon
(2000) argued that human capital raises overall productivity at the societal level as the human
input to economic activity in terms of physical and intellectual effort increases. The overall
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growth in economic activity generates, then, higher needs for new processes and innovations to
further support this growth. Based on the arguments above, we propose the following:
Hypothesis 1: The higher the level of human capital within a country, the higher the
country’s level of innovation will be.
Social capital and innovation
In this paper we also examine the value-generating potential of social capital at the
societal level.  We concur with researchers who argue that social capital creates value that is vital
for effective functioning of communities and societies. Some scholars have used the ‘innovative
milieu’ as an example of how social capital affects innovation at the regional level. Innovative
milieus are characterised by intensive interactions among local firms as well as by other
characteristics such as physical and institutional elements, the local labour market and a
willingness to learn (Maillat and Lecoq, 1992; Maillat, 1995). It has been argued that the success
of such milieus in terms of innovation depends on a region’s ability to stimulate intensive
cooperation as well as high-quality relationships among the local scientific, operational and
financial systems (Maillat, 1998). As Storper (1995: 203) stated it: ‘The milieu is essentially a
context for development, which empowers and guides innovative agents to be able to innovate
and to co-ordinate with other innovating agents.’ However, the existing literature on innovative
milieus has also been criticized for a lack of clarity in terms of the direction of causality. That is,
does innovation occur because of the existence of a milieu, or does a milieu develops when there
is innovation in a region (Storper, 1995)?
A number of studies that focused on social capital and the overall well-being of societies
support the arguments for the positive effect of social capital on innovation. For instance, in a
study of social capital in 29 market economies Knack and Keefer (1997) found social capital to
be associated with better economic performance.  Along these same lines, Nichols (1996)
attributed the recent social and economic problems that Russia is facing to the lack of social
capital. Decades of communist rule, this author suggested, have eroded trust and eliminated all
forms of voluntary civic engagement. In line with a growing body of research in the field, we
define a country’s social capital as societal features that comprise trust, associational activity, and
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norms of civic behaviour that together facilitate coordination and cooperation for collective
benefit (Paxton, 1999; Helliwell & Putnam, 1995; Nichols, 1996; Knack & Keefer, 1997. Below
we advance hypotheses that link these different dimensions of social capital to innovation.
Previous researchers have argued that trust, both within organisations and in inter-
organisational settings, may foster innovation. First, within organisations, trust has been found to
be important to innovation in that it lessens the need for rigid control systems (Quinn, 1979).
Tight monitoring and control mechanisms reduce creative thinking, while freedom from rigid
rules and job definitions enhances idea generation. Second, trust is not only important for
innovation through interactions between individuals within an organisation but also through inter-
organisational cooperation. The literature on innovation has emphasized that the development and
adoption of new processes and products within a country is the result of the interaction between
capabilities that are specific of each firm and industry (Dosi, 1988). The capacity to maintain a
continuous flow of innovation within a country, therefore, depends on the ability to diffuse basic
knowledge to organisations that interact in R&D and production activities among others. A high
level of trust among organisations within a country facilitates the exchange of confidential
information by diminishing the risk that one party will opportunistically exploit this information
to the other’s disadvantage (Knack & Keefer, 1997). In short, trust has for long been considered
an essential component for most forms of social exchange and interdependence and many have
even argued that the willingness to interact with others (individuals or organisations) is for the
most part contingent on the prevalence of trust (Blau, 1964). Trust facilitates social exchange by
reducing the need for time consuming and costly monitoring, and therefore makes it possible for
people and organisations to devote added time for other beneficial actions and endeavours.
Research on trust, however, has shown that trust is a multidimensional construct and that
various forms of trust exist. In their review of the trust literature, Rousseau et al. (1998) advanced
three forms of trust: deterrence-based, calculus-based, and relational-based. Deterrence-based
trust emphasizes utilitarian considerations and is founded on the belief that efficient sanction
mechanisms are in place. These sanctions make breach of contract costly and thus enable parties
to cooperate and expect reciprocation. Calculus-based trust, on the other hand, arises out of
rational choice and objective information regarding the credibility and competence of exchange
partners. Finally, relational-based trust describes a type of trust that may be the product of
repeated interactions that foster norms of reciprocity, reliability, and dependability. Here,
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emotions enter into the relationship because of the formation of attachment and interpersonal
care.
Trust has also been discussed as a cultural variable whereby societies’ propensity to trust
differ.  For example, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) discussed differences between nations in
people’s propensity to trust. These authors argued that certain societies have a positive view of
human nature, and as such are more likely to trust (e.g. Japan).  Other societies (e.g. the United
States) have less of a positive view and are likely to formalise most types of economic exchange
with contracts and other monitoring and deterrence tools.
The above brief description of how trust has been conceptualised provides some guidance
to our investigation of the role of trust in fostering innovation at the societal level. We examine
two types of trust, with each dimension referring to a different focus, i.e. individuals or
organisations. The first dimension relates to the trust that people have in others in any given
society.  This, in fact, captures the interpersonal facet of trust and includes both the calculus-
based (i.e. rational) and relational-based (i.e. emotional) of trust as discussed earlier. This is what
we will refer to as generalized trust. The second dimension relates to trust people have in
institutions or organisations in the given society; in line with previous research, we term this
institutional trust. This type of trust, in fact, captures the deterrence basis for trust as described
earlier. That is, to the degree that the institutions in the environment are seen as efficient in
mediating exchange and protecting individuals against any breach of trust, people are more likely
to exhibit higher willingness to interact and assume risks in their transactions with others. For
example, in societies that have effective patent-registration and protection laws, one may be more
willing to enter in a cooperative relationship, e.g. a joint R&D project, knowing that there are
credible and efficient mechanisms that will deter a partner from any possible breach of trust. On
the other hand, where patent laws and institutions are ineffective or, even worse, absent, one may
be more likely to focus on cooperating with those partners with whom one maintains a stronger
interpersonal trusting relationship.
Consequently, we see both forms of trust, i.e. generalized trust and institutional trust, as
factors that reduce the need for monitoring, increase the willingness of people and organisations
to interact and to share information, knowledge, and other resources, albeit for different reasons.
Therefore, we offer the following two hypotheses:
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Hypothesis 2:  The higher the level of generalized trust within a country, the higher the
country’s level of innovation will be.
Hypothesis 3:  The higher the level of institutional trust within a country, the higher the
country’s level of innovation will be.
Associational activity describes the general tendency for people in a society to be active
members in associations and voluntary-type organisations (Knack & Keefer, 1997). The
important role of these associations in fostering the economic and social well-being of
communities and societies is well documented. Associational activity is often a local activity that
provides individuals with contacts with others within the own community as well as with others
at the regional level, whereby the associations’ members are from a variety of backgrounds and
professions.  For example, Putnam (1993) suggested that the higher success of the northern
Italian communities as compared to the southern communities is, to a great degree, based on
richer associational life. These voluntary associations, this author argued, create in their members
habits of mutual support and solidarity. In addition to support and solidarity, the presence of a
dense network of associations within a region may also play an important role in attracting
resources such as venture capital, which will ultimately increase investment in innovative
activities. For instance, Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) argued that the entrepreneurs’ professional
relationships with influential people helped significantly in locating capital for project funding.
Furthermore, Chell and Baines (2000) showed how many owner-managers of small businesses
use their contacts in organisations like Chambers of Commerce and Small Business Federations
and also more informal organisations to provide a source of useful ideas and business
relationships: ‘ … you pick up the phone to have a chat with somebody … or you ‘re on the golf
course – the classic kind of think – and people are going to give business to each other …’ (Chell
& Baines, 2000: 209).
Therefore, associational activity may foster innovation through membership in multiple
organisations, which increases one’s exposure to different ideas and provides different sources of
information. The prevalence of such associations in a society and high participation in these
associations increases information and knowledge exchange at both the individual and
organisational level, and is as such an important factor that fosters innovation.
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The arguments above are consistent with the resource dependency theory (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978) and its application in the context of a firm’s board of directors as a network of
interlocking directorates (Johannisson & Muse, 2001).  Zajac and Westphal (1996), for example,
argued that board members are often selected as a mechanism to reduce environmental
uncertainty. That is, as boundary spanners, board members that belong to a variety of external
organisations and associations help link firms within a society to their external environment, and
therefore, provide access to novel information and other critical resources (George, Wood, &
Khan, 2001).  Along these same lines, in their study of managerial networks, Carroll and Teo
(1996) found widely dispersed managerial social networks to be associated with higher
accessibility to resources. Although managerial networks, including interlocking directorates,
may be characterised by their own particular value system and therefore function somewhat
differently compared to non-managerial networks and associations, these managerial networks
can provide business professionals with a variety of ideas and resources necessary for new,
innovative activity.
In short, the diversity of business and social circles to which one belongs (e.g. clubs,
charitable organisations, and business associations) provides the opportunity to access multiple
domains that may provide unique sources for information, financial funding, and political
support, among other desirable resources that increase the propensity for innovation. The above
discussion can be stated more formally through the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4:  The higher the level of associational activity within a country, the higher
the country’s level of innovation will be.
Norms of civic behaviour describe the general tendency of people in a society to
cooperate and to subordinate self-interest for that of the society (Knack & Keefer, 1997).  Such
norms are said to act as informal mechanisms that limit predatory, self-interest behaviour and
encourages individuals to exhibit higher care and concern for the public good. Norms of civic
behaviour and associational activity often go together in many cases since individuals that are
committed to the well-being of the local community or broader society may be more willing to
participate in a variety of communal activities and expose themselves to others’ views with the
ultimate goal of reaching a consensus that is best for all. However, the two concepts are distinct
15
and do not necessarily evolve in the same direction.  For example, Onyx and Bullen (2000) found
multiple distinct components that collectively define social capital.  In addition to trust, these
components include items that speak to people’s participation and involvement in local events
and association, and norms of helping and good citizenship. The distinction between associational
activity and norms of civic behaviour is further supported by a number of cross-cultural
researchers.  Hofstede (1991) and Triandis (1995), along with many others, discussed cross-
national differences in collectivism-individualism. This cultural trait describes societies’
preferred fundamental organisation, i.e. the individual versus the group.  Across nations,
differences were found in the degree to which people prefer to belong to cohesive groups.  At the
same time, Hofstede (1980, 1991) identified masculinity-femininity as a cultural attribute of
societies. This variable addresses differences in whether societies value caring and concern for
others, versus subordination of others needs and goals for one’s own achievement.  While, the
two cultural variables discussed above differ conceptually from associational activity and norms
of civic behaviour, we argue that at the societal level, the tendency to join formal groups, and the
tendency for good citizenship are distinct constructs.
Furthermore, the distinction between associational activity and norms of civic behaviour
is also supported by Olson (1984) who argued that the main objective of some regional or
national associations is mainly the accomplishment of the members’ self-interests rather than the
overall well-being of the local community or society. This author found that associations can
impose high costs on a society’s well-being as they function as special interest groups that lobby
for preferential treatments. Finally, while being a member of an association may provide a venue
for civic engagement, an array of other options are available to individuals who consider being a
good citizen and caring for the society’s overall well-being as an important personal goal. In
short, we confer that associational activity and norms of civic behaviour along with trust
constitute three facets, or components, that collectively define social capital at the societal level.
Prior research has examined the role of ‘being civic’ at the company level as well as the
societal level. For instance, Kilkenny, Nalbarte and Besser’s (1999) study on small towns located
in Iowa showed that civic participation in the community had a positive impact on business
success. Similarly, Putnam (1993) argued that certain areas within Italy have become more
economically prosperous compared to others because they were more civic, and, at the national
level, Knack and Keefer (1997) found countries with stronger civic norms to have enjoyed more
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economic growth in the period 1980-1992 compared to their less civic counterparts. Norms of
civic behaviour may foster innovation directly through their effect on the exchange of ideas and
knowledge, which has been regarded by numerous researchers as a facet of cooperative
behaviour. For instance, Argyle (1991) argued that successful cooperation in work groups
includes coordination, helping, communication, and division of labour. Along these same lines,
Tjosvold (1988) identifies various dimensions associated with a cooperative relationship,
including the exchange and combination of information. Tjosvold’s view of cooperation provides
a direct and parsimonious link to innovation, that is, where norms of civic behaviour are high,
there is a higher tendency to share ideas and information (either within or outside formal groups),
and consequently, knowledge transfer is expected to be more extensive. Therefore, given the
positive effects of extensive and free flow of ideas and resources on innovation, we advance the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5:  The higher the norms of civic behaviour within a country, the higher the
country’s level of innovation will be.
METHODOLOGY
Data and sample
In testing our hypotheses we use three secondary data sources. First, we assess the level of
human capital using the Human Development Index (HDI) provided by the United Nations World
Development Program. The Human Development Index is a composite of three basic components
of human development within a country: life expectancy, educational level and standard of living.
Second, we measure the level of social capital within a country based on the data provided by the
World Value Survey. The World Values Survey is a worldwide investigation of socio-cultural
and political change conducted by the University of Michigan and includes national surveys on
the basic values and beliefs of the population in more than 65 countries. This survey
complements the European Values Survey, first carried out in 1981.  The wealth of data
generated by the multiple waves of the survey have been widely used to investigate a number of
phenomena at the country or national level.  In addition to many other phenomena, the survey
was used to investigate trust and well-being across nations (Inglehart, 1999), values and cultural
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change (Inglehart & Baker, 2000), political and economic change (Basanez, 1993; Inglehart,
1997), nationalism (Dogan, 1994), and educational attainment (Doring, 1992).  In general, these
studies and many others, confirmed that important political, economic, social, and cultural
phenomena are changing, and are doing so differently across nations.  Our study leverages the
third wave of the World Values Survey, which was carried out in 1995. The surveys in the
countries were carried out through face-to-face interviews at home and in the respective national
languages. Within each country, the sampling universe consisted of all adult citizens, with ages
18 and older. The sample size for each country ranges from about 600 to 3,000. Third, we assess
country-level innovation from a database maintained by the World Bank. By using innovation
data pertaining to 1998, i.e. three years later than the year in which human capital and social
capital were measured, we effectively test for the causality of the relationships implied in our
hypotheses.  In short, we base our analyses on countries on which we had data on human capital,
social capital and innovation. Our final sample includes 59 countries from all five continents, i.e.
30 countries in Europe, 12 countries in America, 3 countries in Africa, 13 countries in Asia, and
Australia.
Constructs
Human capital: Several measures has been used to gauge individuals’ human capital, such
as the highest level of education, the amount of vocational training, one’s age, and relevant
management or industry experience (Hinz & Jungbauer-Gans, 1999; Guzman & Santos, 2001;
Kilkenny, Nalbarte, & Besser, 1999). We measure human capital at the country level as the
combination of three indicators covering the citizens’ overall knowledge, economic resources,
and physical well-being. More specifically, we represent a country’s human capital as being
represented as its citizens’ educational attainment (i.e. a combination of the average years of
schooling and literacy rate), average income, and longevity (i.e. life expectancy). Each dimension
of this composite index has a value between 0 and 1, and reflects where each country stands in
relation to this scale. For instance, the minimum for life expectancy is 25 years and the maximum
85 years, so the longevity component for a country where life expectancy is 55 years would be
0.50. The scores for the three dimensions are averaged in an overall index. The mean value is .80,
with a standard deviation of .15. The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure is .75.
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We acknowledge that other dimensions such as professional and vocational training or
industry-specific experience may be useful indicators of human capital as well. As mentioned
earlier, prior research has argued that the level and quality of vocational training may foster a
country’s productivity and economic growth (Prais, 1995). Although we did not have access to
country-level data pertaining to vocational training or overall relevant industry experience among
a country’s citizens, we checked for the validity of our human capital measure by examining its
correlation with a proxy for a country’s overall know-how pertaining to innovation, i.e. its
relative number of scientists, engineers and technicians working on R&D related activities. We
indeed found that a country’s relative number of R&D-related professionals is positively related
to its overall level of human capital (r = .571; p < .001) as well as to our human capital dimension
‘educational attainment’ (r = .592; p < .001).
Building on previous research on social capital at the country level, we measure social
capital through assessing the levels of generalized trust, institutional trust, associational activity,
and norms of civic behaviour (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Putnam, 1993; Paxton, 1999).
Generalized trust: Generalized trust is measured by asking the respondents: ‘Generally
speaking, would you say (1) that most people can be trusted, or (2) that you can’t be too careful in
dealing with people’ (Knack & Keefer, 1997). Our generalized trust indicator is the percentage of
respondents in each country that chose for the first option. The mean value is 28.6%, with a
standard deviation of 14.0%.
Institutional trust: Institutional trust is measured by asking the respondents how much
confidence they have in a variety of organisations or institutions, such as the legal system, the
government or major companies (Knack & Keefer, 1997). The respondents could choose a
number from 1 (a great deal of confidence) to 4 (no confidence at all). We reversed the scales so
that larger values reflect greater institutional trust, and we averaged the values over all (sixteen)
items. The mean value is 2.47, with a standard deviation of .20. The Cronbach’s alpha for this
measure is .88.
Associational activity: Associational activity is measured by asking the respondents
whether they are an active member of various organisations, including professional associations
and political parties (Knack & Keefer, 1997). The respondents could choose a number from 1
(active member) to 3 (don’t belong). We reversed the scales so that larger values reflect greater
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associational activity, and we averaged the values over all (nine) items. The mean value is 1.24,
with a standard deviation of .22. The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure is .94.
Norms of civic behaviour: Consistent with prior research (e.g. Knack & Keefer, 1997) we
assess norms of civic behaviour by asking the respondents whether a list of five behaviours ‘can
always be justified, never be justified or something in between’, e.g. ‘accepting a bribe in the
course of your duties,’ or  ‘cheating on taxes if you have the chance’. The respondents could
choose a number from 1 (never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable). We reversed the scales so
that larger values reflect greater norms of cooperation, and we averaged the values over the five
items. The mean value is 8.70, with a standard deviation of .75. The low variation of this measure
across countries may be explained by the respondents’ reluctance to admit to cheating. The
Cronbach’s alpha for this measure is .86.
We find that associational activity and norms of civic behaviour do not covary (Table 1; r
= .094, p = .489), which illustrates that these two dimensions of social capital are indeed different
constructs. In order to further assess the discriminant validity between associational activity and
norms of civic behaviour, we examine the correlations among the items measuring associational
activity and norms of civic behaviour respectively, as well as the correlations between items
measuring the different constructs. We find that all correlations among the items measuring
associational activity are positive and significant (except for one correlation) at p < .001.
Similarly, the correlations among the items measuring norms of civic behaviour are all positive
and significant (p < .001). However, none of correlations between items measuring associational
activity and norms of civic behaviour are significant. This finding further illustrates that
associational activity and norms of civic behaviour are indeed different constructs.
We measure innovation by combining several dimensions related to the level of
technology-related activities and output generated in a given country. Prior research has
suggested several indicators to measure innovation, such as the amount of patents filed and used
(e.g. Jaffe, 1989), the expenditures for research and development (Ritsilä, 1999), the number of
innovations reported in trade journals and research periodicals (Acs, Audretsch, & Feldman,
1994), the use of industry-specific yardsticks (Smallbone & North, 1997), and self-reported data
(Keeble, 1997). Further, some researchers have argued that countries with export-oriented firms
may enhance their international competitiveness since such firms help to foster modernization
and living conditions, especially if the focus is on technology-based export (Bianchi, 2001; Berry,
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1997; Nadvi, 1997). Since many of the previously used dimensions for innovations have
strengths and weaknesses (e.g. Kalantaridis & Pheby, 1999), we assess country-level innovation
using a combination of three indicators.  The first is the number of patents registered in a country
for a given year; the second is the expenditures for R&D (as a percentage of a country’s GNP),
and the third is the volume of high-technology exports (relative to the total manufactured
exports). These data were drawn from the Worldbank.
Number of patents: Some scholars have questioned the validity of the number of patents
for innovation as this measure focuses on a rather narrow aspect of innovative activity, excluding
product modifications as well as process innovation or activities such as fashion design
(Kalantaridis & Pheby, 1999). Further, some previous researchers have argued that patent
statistics are more appropriate for measuring inventions rather than innovation as many ideas
patented never become viable products (Shane, 1992). However, we think that the number of
patents is a valid measure for tapping a country’s innovative output because this measure captures
an important aspect of the level of technological activity, and because several fundamental
conditions need to be fulfilled in order for an activity or invention to qualify for patent eligibility,
e.g. the invention must be novel, useful, and exhibit an ‘inventive step’ in that it is non-obvious to
practitioners skilled in the technology field (Evenson, 1984). Our measure for the number of
patents is the aggregate of patents filed by residents and non-residents in a country. The mean
value is 57,581, with a standard deviation of 71,259.
Expenditures for R&D: Our second measure of innovation assesses the level of
investment made in R&D as a percentage of a country’s GNP (Ritsilä, 1999). This dimension
reflects the extent to which a country allocates resources to systematic activities aimed at
increasing the overall stock of knowledge, including fundamental and applied research and
experimental development work leading to new devices, products, or processes. The mean value
of this measure across all 59 countries is 1.26%, with a standard deviation of .88%.
High-technology export: Our third technological innovation measure assesses the
importance of a country’s export of high-tech products relative to the total manufactured export.
As mentioned earlier, some prior research has argued that a country’s overall productivity and
competitive posture depends on the ability to foster export among its firms (e.g. Berry, 1997).
Therefore, we maintain that the extent to which a country’s technological output is spread over
the rest of the world, relative to its total export level, is an alternative indicator of how much
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‘innovative activity’ is created and disseminated by a country. Because industrial sectors
characterized by a few high-technology products may also produce many low-technology
products, the identification of high-tech export is based on the calculation of R&D intensity (i.e.
R&D expenditure divided by total sales) for groups of products, rather than industries. Our final
measure is the ratio of a country’s export in high-technology products to the total manufactured
export. The mean value is 12.3%, with a standard deviation of 12.9%.
In order to assess the convergent validity of our several measures for innovation, we
examine their correlations with each other. One way of assessing convergent validity is indeed
measuring the extent to which different constructs of the same concept are correlated to each
other (Babbie, 1990). We find that all three measures of innovation are positively (ranging
between .351 and .694) and significantly (p < .02) correlated with each other (Table 1). Further,
we also assess predictive validity by examining the correlations between our innovation measures
on the one hand and a country’s overall economic well-being (measured by its GNP) on the other
hand. Again, we find that a country’s GNP is positively (ranging between .323 and .723) and
significantly (p < .02) correlated with all three innovation measures.
Country size: We include country size in terms of total population as a control variable
since country-level innovation is also effected by the number of people within a country.  Larger
countries are characterized by more extensive exchange of all types of resources at multiple
levels. Therefore, larger countries may generate more patents, involve in more R&D
expenditures, and have more high-tech export compared to smaller countries. The mean value of
this control variable is 75.05, with a standard deviation of 203.51.
Income gap: Prior research has argued that it is not as such the average income within a
country that drives overall productivity but rather how well income is distributed among a
country’s citizens (Knack & Keefer, 1997). That is, it has been argued that in societies with high
social polarization (i.e., with a large income gap between the ‘rich’ and the ‘poor’), groups within
the country are more willing to impose costs on society, are less likely to engage in high-quality
relationships with others, and therefore ultimately hamper economic development. For instance,
Knack & Keefer (1997) found a negative relationship between the level of trust within a society
on the hand and the income gap on the other hand; however, these researchers did not find that
the effect of the level of trust among a country’s citizens on its overall economic wealth changed
after the effect of the ‘income gap’ was taken into account. In order to examine whether social
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polarization affects the impact of the level of social capital on a country’s innovation, we include
a country’s ‘income gap’ as a control variable in some of the regression equations. Income gap is
measured as the difference in income between a country’s ‘top 10% household group’ and its
‘bottom 10% household group.’ The mean value of this variable is 25.69 with a standard
deviation of 8.34.
RESULTS
An analysis of the bivariate correlation coefficients provides some interesting results
(Table 1). First, human capital is positively correlated with the number of patents filed,
expenditures in R&D, and high-technology export. Second, generalized trust and institutional
trust are also positively correlated with at least one of the innovation measures. Interestingly,
generalized trust and institutional trust are unrelated to each other, which illustrates that the levels
of trust one has in other individuals versus institutions do not necessarily covary. Finally,
associational activity, and to a lesser extent norms of civic behaviour, is unrelated to our
innovation measures. As mentioned earlier, associational activity and norms of civic behaviour
are unrelated to each other, which is an indication that these dimensions of social capital are
separate constructs.
Insert Table 1 About Here
Hypotheses 1 to 5 are tested using multiple regression analyses. The results are
summarized in Table 2. Hypothesis 1 is supported, in that we find a strong positive relationship
between human capital and all three innovation measures. Further, partial support is found for
Hypotheses 2 and 3: generalized trust and institutional trust are positively related to at least one
of the three innovation measures, that is generalized trust positively affects the number of patents
and the level of R&D expenditures whereas institutional trust has a positive effect on the level of
high-technology export. In other words, it appears that the level of trust that one holds in other
persons as well as in institutions to some extent encourages innovative activities within a country,
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after controlling for population size. Further, we find only partial support for Hypothesis 4: there
is a significant effect of associational activity on only one of our innovation measures, i.e. R&D
expenditures. Finally, contrary to Hypothesis 5, we find a negative relationship between norms of
civic behaviour and high-technology export. We also include income gap as a control variable in
three additional regression equations and find that countries in which welfare is more equally
distributed score higher on all three innovation measures, but the effect is only significant for
R&D expenditures.
Insert Table 2 About Here
DISCUSSION
The results provide significant support as to the role of human capital as a catalyst for
innovation. This is in line with our predictions which were based on theoretical support for the
positive effects of human capital on a wide array of country-level outcomes including economic
growth, productivity, and in this case innovation. In other words, although the beneficial effect of
human capital on economic development may be based partly on the extent to which resources,
experience and educational background are embedded in open interactions within a specific
community or region, we find that the overall level of human capital across all individuals within
a country positively impacts overall innovative activity.
The results with respect to social capital are mixed.  These findings support the idea that
proxies for social capital, widely used in the literature, do not necessarily constitute a set of
coherent indicators and may not work in a similar way. The results also support the idea that
places with only high levels of social capital do not prosper when human capital is weak.  Prior
researchers have indeed noted that social capital does not necessarily have a positive impact on
economic development (Portes, 1995; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; Woolcock, 1998). For
instance, some communities or regions may possess too much social capital in that tightly-knit
groups may impose significant constraints on the members of local communities which inhibits
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these members’ attempts to join larger, more extensive, and perhaps more innovative networks
(Woolcock, 1998).
The results of our analysis confirm the important role of trust as a driver of innovation.
By facilitating exchange and reducing the need for time consuming and expensive monitoring,
trust fosters more extensive and unconstrained cooperation, freer exchange of information, which
may ultimately lead to more R&D related activities and inventions (Jones, & George, 1998).  The
strong positive association between institutional trust and high-tech export may be explained by
the role of government agencies and chambers of commerce in promoting and stimulating export
of high-end technology-based products. Overall, our results are in line with previous research that
has consistently underscored the value of trust to individuals, organisations, and societies
(Fukayama, 1995; Putnam, 1993).
As mentioned earlier, in order to test whether and how the distribution of wealth within a
country affects the impact of social capital (especially trust) on innovation, we also included a
country’s income gap (i.e. the income difference between the ‘top 10%’ and ‘bottom 10%’
households) in three additional equations (Table 2). We found that the positive impact of
generalized trust on innovation diminishes significantly when the effect of income gap is taken
into account. This finding suggests that high income differences within a country’s borders do not
only decrease the extent to which its citizens trust each other (cf. the negative and significant
correlation r = -.459, p < .001 between both constructs, Table 1), but also that even in countries
where individuals do trust each other, high income differences between the ‘rich’ and the ‘poor’
may hamper innovative activity. An important implication is that policy makers may need to
develop policies that do not focus solely on supporting a limited group of the population or
particular industries, but also on examining how welfare can be distributed in a more equal way
across the population within a given community, region or country.
The positive relationship between associational activity and only one of our innovation
measures (i.e. R&D expenditures) may be explained by the fact that membership of and
participation in associations is often a local activity whereas we measured innovation at the
societal level. A related possible explanation for the weak relationship between associational
activity and innovation lies in the potentially conflicting influences of associational activity on
economic growth in general, as suggested by prior research  (e.g. Knack & Keefer, 1997; Portes
& Landolt, 1996). That is, whereas a rich associational life within a country may foster habits of
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cooperation and solidarity among its population, and therefore lead to economic success (Putnam,
1993), the potential conflict of the goals of smaller groups within society with goals of other
groups may diminish the overall effect of associational activity on economic performance at the
country-level (Knack & Keefer, 1997). In other words, many associations may work as special
interest groups that lobby for preferential policies and protection of the status quo, and therefore
hamper risky, innovative activities. As mentioned earlier, prior research has indeed suggested that
strong, tightly-knit groups may hamper economic development by protecting a disproportionate
part of natural resources or by inhibiting individuals’ personal advancement and posing strong
personal obligations on them (Portes & Landholt, 1996).  It can be noted that this phenomenon
has also been found by researchers in the field of organisational behaviour. For instance, in his
study of intergroup conflict, Sherif (1958) found that high levels of identification with a particular
group may often foster animosity and hostility against other groups.
Similarly, the relationship between norms of civic behaviour and innovation is very weak
and even negative for one of our innovation measures (i.e. high-technology exports).  One
possible explanation could be that adherence to norms that reflect the general tendency of ‘being
a good citizen’ is generally contradictory to the general willingness to deviate from existing rules
and procedures that has often been shown to be necessary for innovative activities. Radical
innovation often entails risky decisions since the costs related to innovation are high and the
market success of radical new products is uncertain (Zahra, 1993). Also, innovations often
require proactive behaviour in that aggressive actions are undertaken by firms which challenge
the rules of competition in an industry and the industry’s well-established leaders (Lumpkin &
Dess, 1996). Such ‘aggressive actions’ may indeed involve decisions that are not readily accepted
by the norms within a society. For example, the rise of privately-owned start-ups in China may
have led to greater national development and may have improved the country’s competitive
position in high-technology sectors. However, such start-ups were often not regarded as a
respectful and wise career path as they did not belong to the standard, though widely constraining
network of public enterprises (Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000).
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LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In this study we test a model that speaks to the role of human capital and social capital in
fostering innovation at the country level.  While we believe our investigation provides additional
insight as to the societal benefits of these two forms of capital, one should be aware of a number
of limitations.  First, significant within-country variations in the levels of human and social
capital often exist and lead to disparities as to the benefits generated to regions and communities
within a given country.  So while Putnam (2000), Paxton (1999), Nichols (1996), Knack and
Keefer (1997), Wong (1998) and Hyden (1997), among others, discussed social and/or human
capital at the societal level (e.g. United States, Russia, Former socialist Czechoslovakia), many
authors have shown how within-country, community, and industry variations in the levels of one
or both forms of capital lead to differences in the value generated (Putnam, 1993; Onyx & Bullen,
2000; Pennings & van Witteloostuijn, 1998).
Second, in operationalizing our three constructs, human capital, social capital, and
innovation, we used secondary data sources published by academic and international
organizations.  As is often the case, secondary data do not perfectly cover the domains of the
constructs they attempt to measure.  For example, individual-specific human capital, the focus of
this study, has been defined as the knowledge that persons hold that is applicable to a broad range
of domains.  Prior research has used a number of proxies to operationalize this construct
including managerial and entrepreneurial experience, level of academic education, vocational
training, age, and income among others (Hinz & Jungbauer-Gans, 1999; Guzman & Santos,
2001; Kilkenny, Nalbarte, & Besser, 1999).  In this study, our measure of human capital at the
country level includes three facets.  These are the citizens’ overall knowledge, economic
resources, and physical well-being. Consequently, our measure does not fully capture prior
experience and vocational training that have been advanced as proxies for human capital.
Furthermore, while economic and physical well-being may be seen as a consequence of
educational attainments, we believe that their use as proxies provides a more complete picture of
the human potential to innovate.
In summary, in this paper we propose a model of human capital, social capital and
innovation at the societal level in which human capital and social capital are posited to increase
innovation. The support for the relationship between human capital and innovation is strong, and
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that for social capital and innovation is mixed.  We believe that more research is needed on the
role of human capital and social capital in fostering innovation within and across societies. For
instance, our indicators of innovation are biased towards technology-based innovation activity
and exclude other forms of innovation in domains that are either non-science based or are
process-type innovations.  Future researchers may also examine more in-depth the nature of the
relationship between social capital and human capital. For instance, one could argue for a
recursive positive relationship between social capital and human capital (Coleman, 1988;
Gradstein & Justman, 2000; Serageldin & Dasgupta, 1999). That is high levels of social capital
may be expected to enhance one’s chances to further his or her skills, ability, and education.
Likewise, one’s own education and well-being can also lead to greater involvement in
associations and greater access to others with resources. Future longitudinal studies may shed
more light on the nature of the relationship between human capital, social capital, and success of
societies. Finally, the question of how and why the two forms of capital create value differently
across different cultures and regions remains an area that warrants further investigation.
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TABLE 1:
Means, standard deviation, ranges, coefficients alpha, and correlations of the variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Human capital
2 Generalized trust (%) .399**
(.002)
3 Institutional trust -.427***
(.001)
.067
(.613)
4 Associational activity -.389**
(.004)
-.051
(.711)
.411**
(.002)
5 Norms of civic behaviour -.048
(.725)
.207
(.120)
.301*
(.022)
.094
(.489)
6 Population (million) -.321*
(.038)
.227+
(.084)
.243+
(.064)
-.018
(.893)
.209
(.115)
7 Income gap -.307*
(.038)
-.459***
(.001)
.145
(.336)
.210
(.176)
.113
(.458)
.173
(.249)
8 Number of patents .461***
(.000)
.472***
(.000)
-.008
(.954)
-.071
(.619)
.244+
(.075)
.027
(.844)
-.261+
(.091)
9 R&D expenditures
(% of GNI)
.619***
(.000)
.662***
(.000)
-.126
(.394)
.093
(.543)
.155
(.299)
-.122
(.408)
-.464**
(.002)
.694***
(.000)
10 High-tech export
(% of total export)
.286*
(.040)
.312*
(.024)
.421**
(.002)
-.059
(.689)
.008
(.958)
.032
(.820)
.057
(.716)
.396**
(.004)
.351*
(.017)
Mean .80 28.55 2.47 1.24 8.70 75.05 25.69 57,581 1.26 12.27
Stand. deviation .15 13.96 .20 .22 .75 203.51 8.34 71,259 .88 12.86
Minimum .37 5.00 2.07 1.07 5.51 1 13.10 226 .03 .00
Maximum .96 63.90 3.37 2.27 9.80 1,239 46.60 417,974 3.76 71.00
Alpha .75 - .88 .94 .86 - - - - -
N=59. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .10; two-tailed tests.
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TABLE 2:
Regression tests
Dependent variable à Number of patents R&D expenditures
(% of GNI)
High-tech export
(% of total export )
H1: Human capital .410*
(.013)
.565**
(.010)
.525***
(.001)
.724***
(.000)
.491**
(.002)
.512**
(.005)
H2: Generalized trust .252+
(.060)
-.015
(.47)
.415**
(.002)
.035
(.43)
.083
(.29)
.081
(.36)
H3: Institutional trust .045
(.39)
.031
(.44)
.051
(.33)
.063
(.32)
.635***
(.000)
.713***
(.000)
H4: Associational activity .018
(.45)
.078
(.35)
.149+
(.096)
.410**
(.005)
.082
(.25)
.194
(.12)
H5: Norms of civic behaviour .095
(.25)
.141
(.21)
.031
(.39)
.057
(.33)
-.365**
(.003)
-.514***
(.001)
Population .069
(.33)
.211
(.16)
-.038
(.38)
.149
(.16)
.112
(.22)
.138
(.21)
Income gap -.223
(.13)
-.390*
(.013)
-.112
(.28)
Adjusted R2 .241 .211 .574 .627 .425 .471
F-value 3.642**
(.005)
2.487*
(.037)
10.89***
(.000)
9.901***
(.000)
6.909***
(.000)
5.957***
(.000)
Coefficients are standardized beta weights. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .10; one-
tailed tests.
